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ABSTRACT: Participatory and cooperative forms of water governance have become regular features of 
government discourse and stated policy objectives in England. We consider this aspiration from the perspective of 
farmers in the English lowlands, by analysing the current power dynamic that exists among these farmers, and 
between them and the key stakeholders involved in water management. To do this we undertake a political 
economy analysis that places lowland farming and water governance within the evolution of historical processes 
that, over time, have influenced the ability of farmers to participate in the governance of their water 
environment. These historical developments are interpreted through the lens of the Power Cube, an analytical 
tool for thinking about the interplay between different forms of power operating in different types of spaces and 
at different levels of governance. Our findings reveal that, despite there being a number of structural changes that 
provide lowland farmers with the opportunity to participate and cooperate in water governance, three distinct 
barriers stand in the way. These relate to the power 'within' these farmers, which continues to align with a 
productivist ideology founded on individualism and competition, often at the expense of the environment; the 
power that government water managers still exercise 'over' farmers instead of 'with' them; and the relationship 
between lowland farming and environmental interests, where historically the two sides’ power 'to' act has been 
diametrically opposed. The findings point to the importance of developing suitable programmes designed to 
support and incentivize farmer participation and cooperation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In England, as elsewhere, the challenge of managing the water environment in the face of competing 
demands is often complex and uncertain (Wallace et al., 2003; Pahl-wostl et al., 2007; Fish et al., 2010). 
Added to this is a growing list of future pressures – climate change, population growth, shifting lifestyle 
preferences – that threaten to exacerbate the situation (Collins and Ison, 2009; Weatherhead and 
Howden, 2009; Barker and Turner, 2011). As a result, the dominant management discourse of the 20th 
century is being revised, with much greater emphasis now placed on enhancing resilience and adaptive 
capacity (DEFRA, 2008; DEFRA, 2011a). In particular, there is a growing awareness of the need to move 
beyond centralised, bureaucratic, and technocratic forms of governance (Hodge, 2007; DEFRA, 2013a), 
to recognise the politicised nature of water use (Watson, 2005), and to appreciate the intrinsic value of 
freshwater ecosystems (DEFRA, 2011b). Part of this change in emphasis has entailed a focus on 
developing more participatory and cooperative forms of water governance. This is reflected, for 
example, in the European Union (EU) Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC), which makes room for 
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the 'active involvement' of all 'interested parties' and 'the public, including water users', and in newly 
instigated national water programmes, such as the Catchment Based Approach.  
The success of people-centred approaches to water governance requires the participation and 
cooperation of farmers. Farming covers almost 70% of England, and has the potential to significantly 
damage or improve the water environment, for example through pollution, physical modification, and 
water abstraction (Strosser et al., 1999). The low-lying areas of England, situated predominantly in the 
south and east of the country, have witnessed the biggest changes to agriculture in modern times and it 
is here that the water environment is under most pressure from a combination of these threats. Yet 
normative claims to develop pluralistic forms of environmental governance often fail to take into 
account the difficulties: there are no panaceas when it comes to developing water institutions 
(Meinzen-Dick, 2007). Instead, attention must be given to the appropriateness of the intended 
approach in light of the particular institutional, cultural and historical context (Wesselink et al., 2011), 
which tends to be more important than the 'purity' of the approach itself (McCay, 2002; Ingram, 2008). 
This implies that notions of farmer participation and cooperation in water governance are highly 
situation-dependent, and points to a need to understand the wider systems of power in which they are 
embedded. 
With this in mind, our intention is to understand how, over time, the interplay of power has come to 
influence the ability of farmers in England to participate and cooperate in the governance of their water 
environment. We are therefore concerned with "the complex configuration of power relations in which 
planners and participants are enmeshed" (Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger, 1998: 1988), and what this 
implies for the future role of farmers in England’s system of water governance. To do this, we 
undertake a political economy analysis that examines lowland agriculture and water governance from 
World War II until the present day. We interpret these historical developments through the lens of the 
Power Cube, an analytical tool for thinking about the interplay between different forms of power 
operating in different types of spaces and at different levels of governance. The research is based on an 
analysis of government documents and other primary texts, and an extensive review of secondary and 
tertiary sources. The work is part of a broader programme examining farmer participation and 
cooperation in English water governance. 
ANALYSING POWER USING THE POWER CUBE 
In this paper we adopt an approach to thinking about and analysing power known as the 'Power Cube' 
(Gaventa, 2006a,b). Simply put, the Power Cube is a heuristic framework for analysing the levels and 
spaces in which different forms of power operate, as well as how these dimensions interact (Figure 1). 
The changing structure of these interactions and the system’s overall pathway or trajectory provides an 
insight into the power dynamics at play, as well as pointing to possible strategies for implementing 
change. Each dimension – levels, spaces, and forms – comprises three sub-components, though in 
reality all three dimensions operate along a continuous scale.  
In its most basic arrangement, the 'levels' dimension of the Power Cube is subdivided into the 'local', 
'national', and 'international'. The 'spaces' dimension is broken down into 'closed spaces', where 
decision making goes on behind closed doors, undertaken by politicians, experts, managers, and other 
elites; 'invited spaces', which are those fora that have come about, often through pressure from outside 
influences, in order to provide other interests with the opportunity to participate in governance 
processes; and 'claimed spaces', which are those spaces that groups of people create for themselves. 
These may be more formal structures such as NGOs or community associations, or they may be more 
informal. The last of the Cube’s three dimensions concerns the different forms that power takes. 
'Visible power' is understood by the adage "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do 
something that B would not otherwise do" (Dahl, 1957). 'Hidden power' relates to the ability of actors 
to control the agenda by influencing the sorts of issues that can be debated and who can participate in 
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the debate in the first place. Finally, 'invisible power' is understood by the adage "A may exercise power 
over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but he also exercises power over him by 
influencing, shaping, or determining his very wants", where this may be achieved by such activities as 
"the control of information, through the mass media, or through the process of socialization" (Lukes, 
2005: 27). 
Figure 1. The Power Cube. 
 
Note: Adapted from Gaventa (2006a) 
Proponents of the Power Cube often make one further distinction. Although power might be typically 
conceived of as a means by which one actor or group is able to exhibit control over another, this is a 
restricted definition which does not easily allow for the "productive aspect of power" (Foucault, 1980: 
119). Alongside the common conception of power 'over', which typically relates to control and 
coercion, three alternative 'expressions' of power have been proposed by Veneklasen and Miller (2002). 
These are power 'with', power 'to', and power 'within'. Power 'with' is the capacity for actors to work 
together; power 'to' concerns an actor’s ability to influence their world through agency; and power 
'within' relates to an actor’s sense of identity and self-worth. Broadly speaking, for farmers to 
participate and cooperate more fully in water governance, certain relationships of power 'over' must be 
transformed into relationships of power 'with'. For this to happen, potential participants require a 
strong enough sense of identity and purpose (power 'within') to instigate change (power 'to') by coming 
together with like-minded individuals as well as with other interests, including the government (power 
'with'). Alternatively, the ability to act that accompanies power 'within' and 'to' may result in the pursuit 
of purely selfish ends by some actors, in turn disrupting the process. 
We posit that the Power Cube is a useful tool for guiding this analysis of farming and water 
governance because of the way it draws attention to the wider multi-level and cross-scale processes 
which make up governance arrangements in our modern, globalised world. At the same time, it allows 
the analyst to reflect on what this wider dynamic implies for farmer participation and cooperation in 
water governance at more local levels, which is the focus of this study. Following Huitema et al. (2009), 
when speaking of 'governance' we adopt Pierre and Petersʼ (2000: 1) definition, namely that 
governance is "the whole range of institutions and relationships involved in the process of governing". 
This includes both formal and informal institutions and, importantly for this paper, "the power relations 
and practices that have developed" over time (Huitema et al., 2009: 27). It is also key to recognise that 
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in speaking of a system of water governance, it is necessary to appreciate that this system "is part of 
broader social, political and economic developments and thus is also affected by decisions outside of 
the water sector" (UNDP, 2014). Again, the Power Cube approach appears well suited to addressing this 
broader conception of the issues relevant to water governance.  
LOWLAND FARMING AND THE WATER ENVIRONMENT: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
In this section we undertake a historical analysis of farming and water governance in England from 
World War II until the present day through a largely political economy approach. We do not intend to 
capture in detail all the developments we discuss, but instead attempt to reveal the broad processes 
and prominent events that have affected the present-day power dynamic. In accordance with the 
Power Cube, we pay attention to the different forms and expressions of power, and the levels and 
spaces they operate in. Due to the nature of the study, it is more difficult to analyse 'invisible power' 
and the expression of power 'within' when compared to the other forms and expressions of power 
because to do so typically requires a more fine-grained and exhaustive approach, for example through 
the use of in-depth interviewing techniques and discourse analysis. Nonetheless, we do reflect upon 
invisible power and power 'within' during the analysis and discussion, although this inherently involves 
a degree of conjecture. The central focus of the analysis is on the relationship between farmers and the 
key actors involved in water management in the English lowlands, with particular emphasis given to 
government and environmental interests.  
Post-war policy (1939 to 1959): The reconstruction of the English countryside 
The onset of World War II dramatically changed English farming. Since the 1870s agriculture had 
suffered chronic depression due to the government’s decision to support low-cost food imports. 
However, the blockade from German U-boats resulted in the urgent prioritisation of greater self-
sufficiency. What most characterised the massive overhaul that agriculture underwent from this time 
onwards was the visible and hidden power the government wielded in closed spaces at the national 
level to intervene in almost every facet of food production, as farmers relinquished their independence 
in return for greater stability and support (Brassley et al., 2012) (Table 1).  
The drive towards efficient production laid out in the 1947 Agricultural Act paved the way for a 
marked transition to modern commercial farming through a system of guaranteed prices, subsidies, 
grants, advice, education, coercion, and the widespread adoption of science and technology in the 
countryside, often characterised as a move 'from agriculture to agribusiness'. In this new system, a 
highly rationalised farming sector geared towards profit maximisation was integrated vertically into a 
system of food production that controlled "all processes from seedling to supermarket" (Newby, 1987: 
193). 
Of particular note was the intimate relationship, founded on the wartime dynamic, that developed 
between the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF) and the National Farmers Union (NFU), who 
together were responsible for deciding the minimum annual prices of food commodities in a system of 
deficiency payments (Winter, 1996). Furthermore, a close relationship developed between many 
farmers and government agricultural extension agents. The job of these agents was to ensure "changes 
in the attitude and behaviour of individuals and the efficient uptake of grant aid", where "these 
relationships with farmers were often characterised by mutual trust and respect developed through 
face-to-face meetings and farmer groups over lengthy periods of time" (Hall and Pretty, 2008: 394).  
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Table 1. The key actors and most prominent elements of the Power Cube’s three dimensions for the 
period 1939-1959.  
Actors Levels Spaces Forms of 
power 
Comments on expressions of power 
MAF and NFUa National Closed Visible and 
hidden 
Corporatist relationship exercising power 
'over' farmers in pursuit of efficient, 
intensive production 
Agribusinesses National and 
regional 
Closed Hidden Gain power 'over' farmers through 
industrialisation of farming practices and 
processes 
River Boards Regional/ 
catchment- 
focused 
Closed Visible 32 Boards with power 'over' land, 
drainage, fisheries, and navigation 
Government 
extension 
workers 
Local Invited Hidden 
and 
invisible 
Extension workers form close 
relationships of power 'with' farmers to 
induce change in behaviour 
Farmers Local Closed Invisible A new power 'within' farmers emerges 
based on productivist ideology 
a
MAF = Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries; NFU = National Farmers Union. 
Other p*ost-war Acts were also significant. In particular, the Town and Country Planning Act 1947 
singled out industrial development and urban sprawl as the major threats to the countryside, whilst 
embracing the prevailing stewardship ethic whereby farmers and landowners, left to their own devices, 
would continue to manage the countryside in a favourable manner consistent with the interest of the 
wider public (Marsden et al., 1993). This custodial interpretation of the role of farming in the 
countryside harked back to the ideological relationship between the landed classes and their estates in 
the 19th century (Newby et al., 1978). As will become evident, the agricultural stewardship discourse is 
an enduring feature of the post-war period, which has been deployed by different actors at different 
points in time. Today, the notion of 'stewardship' still shapes how participation and cooperation in land 
and water management is understood by English farmers. 
These developments were most dramatic in the arable farmlands in the low-lying east of the 
country. The farmers here stood to gain most from increasing their farm’s size, adopting new practices 
and new technology, and intensifying inputs such as fertilisers and pesticides to boost production 
(Grigg, 1989). Referring to the Power Cube, we infer that the visible and hidden power exercised in a 
corporatist closed space at the national level by MAF and the NFU, and the rapport between 
agricultural extension agents and farmers on the ground in turn resulted in the emergence of an 
invisible form of power and a particular sense of power 'within' lowland farmers that was in keeping 
with the productivist ideology (see Table 1). 
Conflicts in the countryside (1960 to 1983) 
In this section we look at key aspects of the power dynamic that developed between 1960 and the early 
1980s, as shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2. The key actors and most prominent elements of the Power Cube’s three dimensions for the 
period 1960-1983.  
Actors Levels Spaces Forms of 
power 
Comments on expressions of 
power 
European Community 
(EC) 
 
European Closed Visible From 1973 the EC begins to exert 
considerable power 'over' 
agricultural policy through the 
Common Agricultural Policy 
MAFF, farming lobby, 
Land Drainage 
Committees, IDBsa 
National, 
regional, and 
local 
Closed Visible, 
hidden, and 
invisible 
The 'MAFFia' exercise power 'over' 
land drainage to further modern, 
intensive farming 
Supermarkets and 
agribusinesses 
National and 
regional 
Closed Visible and 
hidden 
Alongside industrialisation of 
agriculture, power 'over' food 
retail is located increasingly in the 
hands of a select number of 
supermarkets 
Environmental NGOs National and 
regional 
Claimed Visible Strengthening of groups at 
national level and emergence of 
county-level wildlife trusts with 
power 'to' act 
Urban newcomers Local Claimed Visible and 
hidden 
New village inhabitants with 
power 'to' oppose modern farming 
practices 
a
MAFF = Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food; IDB = internal drainage board. 
 A crucial factor in the success of commercial agriculture from the post-war period onwards concerned 
water management, and in particular land drainage in low-lying parts of the country. By the start of the 
1960s, power over water management policy was located firmly at the national level in closed spaces 
occupied by the reformed Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food (MAFF) on the one hand, and the 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government (which from 1970 became the Department of the 
Environment) on the other. After the Water Resources Act 1963 this separation of decision-making 
power was consolidated, with the Ministry of Housing and Local Government retaining responsibility for 
all aspects of water management apart from drainage and fisheries, which belonged to MAFF (Parker 
and Sewell, 1988). As we shall see, land drainage became one of the key issues underlying the 
countryside conflicts that followed. 
By the late 1950s the government had become concerned that growing demand for water by 
farmers, chiefly for irrigation, "might seriously deplete the natural flow of many rivers and streams" 
(CAWC, 1960: 4) and called for statutory powers to control the abstraction of surface water. These 
recommendations were also legislated for in the 1963 Act, which replaced the long-standing common 
law system of riparian water rights (Getzler, 2004) with a permitting regime whereby most users of 
surface water and groundwater required a water abstraction licence. From an organisational 
perspective, a move towards the integration of management functions had been taken in 1948 when 
the 47 existing Catchment Boards were replaced by 32 River Boards charged with overseeing land 
drainage, fisheries and navigation. Another function of the 1963 Act was to replace the 32 River Boards 
with 29 multi-purpose River Authorities that incorporated agricultural land drainage, flood alleviation, 
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pollution prevention, fisheries, and navigation under the jurisdiction of a single administrative 
structure.  
While advances in modern agriculture continued apace throughout the 1960s, this was also a 
decade that witnessed a considerable rise in environmental awareness at both international and 
national levels. In 1949, the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act had been introduced, 
formally ushering in the 'environmental movement' in England (Sheail, 1995). Locally, the power of this 
movement was being strengthened by the large numbers of middle-class city dwellers who were buying 
property in the countryside and who brought with them a set of values and expectations about how the 
countryside should be, based at least in part on a romantic conception of 'rural idyll' (Howkins, 2003). 
The first half of the decade also saw a spate of county-level Wildlife Trusts form 'claimed spaces', which 
were represented at the national level by the Society for the Protection of Nature Reserves.  
It was in the 1970s though that this environmental power base began most forcibly to come into 
conflict with farming interests through a series of local confrontations whose political significance often 
reached well beyond the geographical boundaries of the disagreements themselves (Lowe et al., 1986). 
Not least were cases concerning water management where drainage activity threatened to destroy 
primary and secondary wetland sites through conversion to intensive agriculture (Purseglove, 1988). 
However, the first and perhaps most significant conflict from a political perspective was not related to 
land drainage but to the encroachment of modern farming methods on the heather moorlands of 
Exmoor National Park in southwest England (Brotherton, 1990; Lobley and Winter, 2009a). The issue 
drew attention to important national questions concerning agricultural regulation versus environmental 
protection, including the appropriateness of the voluntary approach for achieving conservation 
measures, the relationship between agriculture and formal planning legislation, and the efficacy of 
National Parks for securing Britain’s landscapes (Newby, 1979; Lobley and Winter, 2009a).  
As we have seen, after World War II most decision-making power concerning agriculture was 
concentrated at the national level within a closed space occupied by MAF and the NFU. Together these 
parties were responsible for directing farming along its productivist trajectory by exercising visible and 
hidden forms of power over farmers (Table 1). However, in 1973 the UK entered into the European 
Community (EC), and much of the power held at the national level was itself to become subsumed by 
decision making at the European level. During the 1970s, while the battle for Exmoor was rumbling on, 
other disputes between farming and conservation interests were emerging. In part the intensity of 
these disagreements was being fuelled by Britain’s succession into the EC and its adoption of the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which by keeping the price of wheat and other grains artificially high 
provided a strong incentive for farmers to convert to intensive forms of arable production, especially 
where this involved a change from low-intensity livestock grazing (Grigg, 1989). Key to such changes in 
wetland sites like the Norfolk Broads, the Fens, and the Kent Marshes of the southeast, or the Somerset 
Levels of the southwest, was artificial drainage to lower water levels, often replacing wetland 
ecosystems which had evolved with farming over hundreds of years (Cook and Williamson, 1999).  
The power that farming interests held over land drainage at this time is evident when considering 
the changes that accompanied the Water Act 1973, which replaced the 29 River Authorities with 10 
truly multifunctional Regional Water Authorities responsible for every facet of water management in 
England. Despite attempts during the run-up to the Act to concentrate all aspects of water policy within 
the Department of the Environment (DoE), the powerful network of public and private agricultural 
interests fronted by MAFF – and coined the 'MAFFia' by its critics – successfully campaigned to retain 
control over the administration of land drainage, including the system of central government grant aid 
subsidies (Purseglove, 1988). This achievement by the farming lobby resulted in the formation of 
separate Regional Land Drainage Committees, made up of landowners and farmers, with the power to 
administer land drainage finance (Parker and Sewell, 1988). At a more local level, Internal Drainage 
Boards (IDBs), created under the Land Drainage Act 1930, were still playing an important role in 
undertaking drainage schemes that supported the advance of commercial agriculture in the most low-
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lying and flood-prone areas of the country. The origins of IDBs date back to at least the 12th century 
(Reeves and Williamson, 2000), and for almost all of their history these authorities have had strong ties 
with landowners and farming, although this relationship and the hidden power structures it embodies 
has been the focus of criticism in more recent times (Purseglove, 1988; Bankoff, 2013). 
It is therefore clear that in the 1970s commercial farming interests were able to exercise both visible 
and hidden power in implementing land drainage schemes by deciding both how funds were allocated 
and who could participate in decisions concerning the nature and operation of such schemes. Land 
drainage designed to bring about intensive forms of farming was strongly supported at all levels by a 
well-resourced Agricultural Department in conjunction with the Regional Land Drainage Committees, 
the farming lobby (with the NFU also holding an office in Brussels), and the local IDBs. Furthermore, 
despite the financial rewards such undertakings might provide for agriculture as a whole, the gains 
were often disproportionately allocated in favour of the larger farmers who had the capital to 
undertake the necessary changes and who were able to benefit from economies of scale, oftentimes at 
the expense of small farmers (Lowe et al., 1986).  
In a similar fashion, these large commercial farmers were able to dictate matters through the hidden 
power they exerted over the decision-making of Regional Land Drainage Committees and IDBs, where 
representation and voting procedures tended to be weighted heavily in their favour (Purseglove, 1988). 
Thus the countryside disputes of the 1970s not only pitted productive agriculture against 
environmental interests, but also large, often arable farmers against smaller farmers who had fewer 
options available and less of an incentive to adhere to the productivist ideology espoused by MAFF and 
the farming lobby, but where a failure to do so could result in continued economic marginalisation and 
even bankruptcy. 
A shift in power (1984 to 1989) 
In Table 3 we summarise the key aspects of the power dynamic that was to emerge after the 
countryside conflicts of the 1960s, 70s and early 80s. This period, discussed in the next two sub-
sections, extends until the start of the new millennium. 
The balance and operation of power at the beginning of the 1980s can be seen by considering the 
positions and contrasting influence of the various farming and environmental interests during the 
passage of the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, covered in detail by Lowe et al. (1986). The process 
revealed the hidden power of the farming lobby at the national level, where they maintained a 
relatively close relationship with agricultural and environmental ministers. This was in contrast to the 
relative powerlessness of the government’s own conservation bodies (Winter, 1996). A key outcome of 
the Act was the ability of landed and farming interests to secure a system of "voluntary co-operation, 
encouraged where necessary by management agreements based on full financial compensation" 
(Marsden et al., 1993: 95). Again, the farming lobby had played to the enduring discourse of agricultural 
stewardship and farmer goodwill in securing these gains (Lowe et al., 1986).  
Overall, the Wildlife and Countryside Act only appeared to further polarise the debate. With its 
introduction in 1981 the disputes between farming and conservation that had arisen in the previous 
decades took on a new significance, with all parties realising that it was how the Act was to be 
interpreted in its first few years that would decide how it would be implemented going forwards. In this 
context the relatively remote set-piece conflicts in wetland sites like Romney Marsh, the Halvergate 
Marshes in the Norfolk Broads, and West Sedgemoor in the Somerset Levels (where at the height of the 
conflict effigies of conservationists hanging by their necks from a makeshift gallows were burnt by local 
farmers) were to set precedents which would affect exactly how the Act was applied in National Parks 
and Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSIs) all over the country (Purseglove, 1988).  
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Table 3. The key actors and most prominent elements of the Power Cube’s three dimensions for the 
period 1984-1999.  
Actors Levels Spaces Forms of 
power 
Comments on expressions of power 
United Nations 
(UN) 
International Closed 
and 
invited 
Visible and 
hidden 
International conferences and 
conventions championing more 
decentralised and participatory 
approaches to water management 
and contributing to a new sense of 
power 'within' 
European Union 
(EU)  
European Closed 
and 
invited 
Visible and 
hidden 
Power 'over' CAP reforms and 
introduction of single-issue water 
directives. Opening up of policy 
processes to develop a degree of 
power 'with' other actors 
Central 
Government 
National Closed Visible Power 'over' national water 
legislation and implementation of EU 
water legislation 
Environment 
Agency (EA) 
National and 
regional 
Closed Visible Charged with power 'over' water 
management in England 
Supermarkets, 
agribusinesses 
National Closed Visible and 
hidden 
Growing power of supermarkets 
'over' farmers and corporate power 
'over' large-scale, industrial farming 
Environmental 
NGOs 
National and 
regional 
Claimed Visible and 
hidden 
Formation of Wildlife Link Committee 
to coordinate environmental lobby’s 
power 'to' act 
Rivers trusts Regional and 
local 
Claimed Visible Power 'to' protect and enhance the 
water environment in certain 
catchments 
Farmer water 
abstractor groups 
Regional and 
local 
Claimed Visible Power 'to' defend rights of irrigators 
against changes to water legislation 
However, other factors were now beginning to derail the progress of intensive agriculture in England, as 
the positive public image of farmers that had emerged after the war (Griffiths, 2012) was being 
replaced by one far less flattering. In part this reflected the public’s growing awareness of the damage 
farming was causing to the country’s landscapes and wildlife, which was given added momentum by a 
string of scientific and popular publications (e.g. Shoard, 1980; Body, 1981; Cheshire and Bowers, 1983). 
And, just as importantly, the economic logic underlying the direction agriculture was taking appeared 
outdated and even nonsensical. The most visible sign that something was awry was the stockpiling of 
'food mountains' and 'milk lakes' throughout Europe, caused by massive overproduction brought on by 
the CAP’s productivist orientation, and the huge costs of storing and disposing of these surpluses 
(Marsden et al., 1993). These factors were shifting the balance of power. The shift was further aided by 
the neoliberal policies of the Thatcher government (Harvey, 2005), which tended to favour free-market 
principles in place of the traditional support shown by Conservatives towards the agriculture sector 
(Flynn et al., 1996).  
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It was this political shift which was to once more change the structure of water management in 
England. As Parker and Sewell (1988: 767) observed, the Water Act 1973 developed a new conception 
of water as "an economic good rather than a subsidised public health service… based upon a 
managerial philosophy, upon a philosophy that 'bigger is better' and upon increased administrative 
efficiency and greater economic efficiency – in short, upon 'business' imperatives". This new attitude 
towards water combined with the wave of privatisations under the Thatcher government in the 1980s. 
By 1989 the functions of the Water Authorities were pared down to the delivery of public water supply 
and sewage treatment and they were floated on the stock market. The remaining water management 
functions were brought under the jurisdiction of a newly formed National Rivers Authority, which in 
1996 became the Environment Agency (EA) when it was merged with Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of 
Pollution and the country’s waste regulation authorities.  
Implementing change in the 1990s 
If the 1980s was a decade when the tide of opinion began to turn away from the productivist regime 
and in favour of the environmental movement and wider social and economic objectives in England’s 
countryside, then it was in the 1990s that this change in emphasis resulted in more fundamental 
alterations to the rules governing agricultural production and environmental protection. Influenced by 
the Uruguay round of GATT (Lowe et al., 2002), at the European level this took place in part through a 
series of major revisions to the CAP (EC, 1991a, b; Kay, 1998), starting in 1992 and ending with Agenda 
2000, which created a second pillar for the CAP budget designed specifically to fund rural development 
initiatives, including agri-environment schemes (Swinbank, 1999; Dobbs and Pretty, 2008). These 
schemes – of which the Environmentally Sensitive Areas and Countryside Stewardship were the most 
prominent – were to further strengthen the relationship between the concept of agricultural 
stewardship and the expectation of financial compensation in the minds of English farmers.  
The power of international conventions to influence the policies and discourses within nations was 
also becoming apparent. Building upon themes first developed during the Conference on the Human 
Environment held in Stockholm during 1972, the UN Conference on Environment and Development in 
1992 in Rio brought international attention to issues of environmental degradation, environmental 
justice, and the need to adopt policies for achieving "sustainable development" as proposed by the 
Bruntland Commission (WCED, 1987). One key theme to emerge concerned the requirement for 
governments to pursue more decentralised and inclusive forms of decision making for managing the 
environment. In Agenda 21, a key output, these ambitions are related directly to water governance 
where it states that "integrated water resources management, including the integration of land- and 
water-related aspects, should be carried out at the level of the catchment basin or sub-basin… based on 
an approach of full public participation" (UNCED, 1992: para 18.9). Public participation in environmental 
decision making was given further support by the Aarhus Convention (UNECE, 1998), which was 
adopted in 1998 and came into force in 2001. 
Despite the growing international consensus to promote decentralised and participatory forms of 
environmental governance, it would be some time before these developments began to have any effect 
on national policy. In 1991 a draft of water-related EU and state legislation was introduced, including 
the EU Nitrates Directive, addressing the harmful effects of nitrogen runoff from agriculture, and the 
Water Resources Act 1991, where Section 57 gave the EA the power to reduce or halt water abstraction 
for spray irrigation during periods of "exceptional water shortage or other emergency". This singling out 
of farming during times of shortage was to rile many irrigators and their representatives in the NFU 
who felt the system was unfairly prejudiced against them (Hamett, 2013). Yet it was indicative of the 
wider attitudinal shift outlined above, where after years of unquestioning support productive 
agriculture was now being legislated against in favour of other interests and objectives in the 
countryside.  
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Although decision-making power concerning water management remained concentrated at the 
national and European levels, environmental and agricultural interests were nonetheless claiming their 
own spaces at the regional and local levels in the form of rivers trusts and farmer 'water abstractor 
groups'. In the southwest of England the first rivers trust gained charity status in 1995 with the aims of 
protecting and enhancing the rivers of the Westcountry. With time more groups formed, and today 
there are over 40 operating in different catchments across England under the overall coordination of a 
national body, The Rivers Trust. At the same time, in the southeast a different form of local organisation 
oriented towards the defence of farmers’ water abstraction rights was emerging. The first of these 
water abstractor groups formed in 1992 in response to a Section 57 order. Since then other groups 
have formed, often as a result of changes to environmental legislation, or the onset of drought and the 
resulting threat of Section 57 (Leathes et al., 2008). Although the groups have tended to have a strong 
lobby focus, they have also offered wider benefits including the promotion of water efficiency 
measures and best practice among their members, and improved communication between the EA and 
farmers in a catchment (Barker and Turner, 2011).  
Lowland farming and water governance in the new millennium  
By the turn of the new millennium, the power dynamic that had emerged to govern lowland farming 
and water in England after World War II had been significantly challenged. The changing political 
context was reflected at the national level by the merging of MAFF with the Department of the 
Environment, Transport and the Regions to create the Department of the Environment, Food, and Rural 
Affairs (DEFRA). As Lowe et al. (2002: 16) have noted, this reform meant that "for the first time since 
the establishment of the Board of Agriculture in 1889 there is now no UK central government 
department with the word 'agriculture' in its title". Furthermore, under new EU legislation, in 2000 the 
first round of the England Rural Development Programme was introduced, providing amongst other 
things a range of agri-environment schemes which farmers could participate in. Yet at the same time, it 
is clear that despite these organisational and institutional changes modern commercial agriculture 
continues to be one of the dominant forces structuring the landscapes of lowland England. Here 
important macro factors – including changing global dietary patterns and the unpredictability of food 
supply resulting from climate change – have played their part by bringing to the fore new narratives 
and concepts like 'sustainable intensification', whilst reviving old ones, such as 'food security' (Marsden, 
2010). These narratives are perhaps paving the way for a 'new productivism' that threatens to eclipse 
previous 'old environmental' concerns centring on landscapes and biodiversity (Lobley and Winter, 
2009b). 
One distinctive feature of the current dynamic governing farming in England relates to the power of 
the retail sector, where by 2013 the top four supermarkets enjoyed 75% of the market share (Kantar, 
2013). This market power, located predominantly at the national level but often also spanning the 
international, allows the supermarkets to exert considerable downward pressure on prices at the farm 
gate (Marsden, 2010). Coupled with stringent food-quality standards, this has encouraged the 
development of large, efficient farms at the expense of small producers who find it particularly 
challenging to comply with supermarket conditions and still make a profit. The trend has been 
exacerbated by the increasingly specialised nature of farming, which often requires sophisticated and 
expensive machinery suited to expansive, homogenised farm units (Mazoyer and Roudart, 2006). Such 
developments have been reflected in changing farm sizes, where there has been a move towards fewer 
but larger production-oriented farms (Walford, 2003). For example, between 1995 and 2005 the 
average farm size in eastern England fell in all size categories apart from holdings of between 5 and 20 
hectares (ha) which rose by nearly 10% (indicating the growth of niche or 'hobby' farms) and farms in 
the largest category of 100 ha or more which rose by 13.4% (DEFRA, 2014).  
Another symptom of the structure of the food supply chain in England is the strong competition 
which often exists between farmers attempting to capture a share of the market, potentially making 
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cooperation harder to achieve. Those examples of where farmers do work together revolve largely 
around producer coops and machinery groups designed to increase bargaining power with processors 
and supermarkets, and to spread financial risk (Youngs, 2013). Furthermore, as Hall and Pretty (2008) 
have demonstrated with their study of farming in the eastern county of Norfolk, the close ties which 
developed between many farmers and the government in the post-war period have been significantly 
undermined in more recent times in response to political shifts and the changing demands placed on 
farmers. The authors conclude that there is now "a striking degree of physical and social distance, 
professional disrespect, divergent agendas and distrust between government delivery agencies and 
farmers, findings that are clearly revealed by many of the government’s own investigations" (Hall and 
Pretty, 2008: 411).  
It is with these features of the agriculture sector in mind that we will consider the developments 
that have occurred in water governance in England since the year 2000, and in so doing move towards 
an understanding of the current power dynamic affecting farmer participation and cooperation. The 
way in which power has come to be structured since 2000 is shown in Table 4.  
Water Framework Directive 
In 2000 the EU Water Framework Directive (WFD) was introduced, becoming part of UK law in 2003. 
This new piece of legislation tied together various existing single-issue EU Directives concerning water 
management under a broad and inclusive approach, whilst setting the ambitious aim of improving all of 
Europe’s water bodies – to raise them up to 'good status' – by the year 2015. By promoting the 
participation of non-state actors in planning and implementation, the Directive also made room for a 
fundamentally different system of water governance to that which had developed in England over the 
course of the 20th century (Page and Kaika, 2003; Collins et al., 2012). This was to provide a new 
impetus for non-governmental organisations like the rivers trusts who now positioned themselves as 
"one of the primary co-deliverers" in efforts to improve England’s water environment (RT, n.d.). The 
change in emphasis brought about by the WFD also entailed a restructuring of power due to its 
requirement for the adoption of pluralistic procedures – 'invited spaces' – operating at the scale of ten 
river basin districts. Each of these hydrological units requires the periodic development and 
implementation of River Basin Management Plans (RBMPs) by a "competent authority or authorities" in 
conjunction with the various interests represented in each river basin. In England sole responsibility for 
delivering the objectives of the WFD was given to the EA as the only competent authority. 
However, as Watson and Treffny (2009) have shown, the process of developing the RBMPs prior to 
the first six-year cycle of the WFD, which runs from 2009 to 2015, largely served to maintain the status 
quo, as decision-making power and overall control continued to reside with the EA and central 
government. Despite a rhetoric of decentralisation and collaboration, by functioning at the broad scale 
of the river basin where a Regional Liaison Panel made up of an invited list of 'co-deliverers' was largely 
consulted on decisions which had already been decided by the EA, local issues and interests 
represented by the likes of environmental groups, municipalities, or farmers failed to enter into the 
process. In this way the government was able to exercise hidden power to control the water 
management agenda in spite of an apparent change in structure and process as mandated for by the 
WFD. At the time Watson and Treffny (2009: 458) concluded that: 
In the following subsections we detail developments that run alongside one another, but which are 
separated out here for the sake of clarity. 
Overall… a modestly reformed bureaucracy continues to be a fundamental element of the institutional 
approach for water management in England. Whilst... more non-state actors are now engaged in aspects of 
water management, they have tended to be assigned to the job of 'rowing' within the reformed 
governance arrangements, while the task of 'steering' remains firmly in the hands of powerful government 
departments and technically oriented public agencies. 
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Table 4. The key actors and most prominent elements of the Power Cube’s three dimensions for the 
period 2000 until the present  
Actors Levels Spaces Forms of 
power 
Comments on expressions of power 
UN International Closed and 
invited 
Visible and 
invisible 
Continuing power 'over' European 
and national policy and influencing 
power 'within' 
World Trade 
Organization 
International Closed Visible Power 'over' key aspects of CAP 
reform 
EU European Closed and 
Invited 
Visible and 
hidden 
Increasingly power 'with' a range of 
interests to develop water and 
environmental policy. Introduction of 
Water Framework Directive (WFD) 
and continuing CAP reforms 
DEFRA National Closed and 
invited 
Visible Subsumed MAFF, Power 'over' 
government water policy and 
implementing EU legislation 
Supermarkets, 
agribusinesses 
National and 
international 
Closed Visible and 
hidden 
Power of supermarkets and 
corporations 'over' farmers, with 
agriculture integrated into global 
supply chains 
EA National and 
regional 
Closed Visible and 
hidden 
Power 'over' WFD process and water 
resources management.  
Environmental 
NGOs 
European, 
national and 
regional 
Claimed Visible and 
hidden 
Increasing influence of groups such as 
the Royal Society for the Protection of 
Birds (RSPB), the World Wildlife 
Foundation (WWF), and the Wildlife 
Trusts with the power 'to' act 
River basin 
liaison panels 
Regional Invited Hidden Group of invited 'co-deliverers' 
operating at scale of 10 large River 
Basin Districts purportedly to share 
power 'with' EA 
Catchment-
based groups 
Local Invited Hidden Offspring of WFD process, providing 
opportunities for private interests 
and water users to share power 'with' 
government water managers 
Rivers trusts Regional and 
local 
Claimed Visible Expansion of trusts to cover 40 
catchments across the country, with 
power 'to' act to protect water 
environment. Under WFD now 
sharing some power 'with' other 
water managers as 'co-deliverers'  
Farmer water 
abstractor 
groups 
Regional and 
local 
Claimed Visible Several nascent groups, with some 
starting to express a willingness to 
develop relationships of power 'with' 
other actors 
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Responding to the threat of a legal challenge from WWF-UK and the Angling Trust concerning a 
perceived failure on the government’s part to implement the WFD in accordance with the terms 
defined in the Directive, in March of 2011, DEFRA released a position statement in which they outlined 
their commitment to implement a Catchment Based Approach (Defra, 2011c). Following on from an 
initial pilot project, in 2013 the Catchment Based Approach was rolled out nationwide. Publications by 
DEFRA during and after the pilot phase would suggest the government has taken a substantial step 
towards facilitating a more pluralistic approach to managing England’s water environment, with 
repeated references to the value of collaborative and partnership working on the ground, the 
importance of retaining the autonomy of local catchment groups, and the need for the government to 
relinquish absolute control over water management and instead embrace change and uncertainty 
(DEFRA, 2012a; 2013a,b,c). Substantiating these claims will require time and critical analyses of the 
situation as it develops. Yet as the government’s own pilot-phase evaluation indicated, the participation 
of farmers in the scheme has been difficult to secure. Work by the government suggests that while 
around a quarter of the participants in the catchment groups were EA staff, farmers only made up 7% 
of the numbers, and here it is likely that at least one reason for becoming involved in the first place was 
to ensure their interests were being represented (DEFRA, 2013b). Although Catchment Based 
Management is clearly in its early stages, statistics like this hint at a situation whereby farming remains 
a sector largely acted upon, even if by a more diverse and localised group of interests, rather than one 
that constructively participates in collaborative decision-making processes intended to bring about 
positive environmental change. 
Water resources management 
Water resources management has become an issue of increasing significance in England, although as 
we have seen most of the historical conflicts concerning farming have tended to revolve around land 
drainage. Under the overall direction of DEFRA, the power to implement and control water resources 
management lies almost entirely with the EA through a system of abstraction licensing. Although a 
resource assessment programme called the Catchment Abstraction Management Strategy (CAMS), 
developed in 1999, was later to orient water quantity management towards the objectives of the WFD 
through its focus on supporting the ecology of water bodies, this has not been accompanied by a shift 
to a more pluralistic stance on planning and implementation at the local level. Despite the fact that the 
CAMS process involved the participation of stakeholder representatives in its early stages, water 
resources management remains a highly technical affair conducted by experts situated in a hierarchical 
organisational structure (Warwick, 2012).  
Yet the Government is currently pushing for an overhaul of the water licensing system, with two 
reform proposals being debated. Whilst they differ, both would better link water licences to the real-
time flow in a waterbody and facilitate the development of water markets (DEFRA, 2011a). A potential 
upshot of reforming the system along these lines is that it could encourage water users to become 
more involved in a degree of cooperative management within catchments, a view suggested by the 
RSPB and supported by the NFU (ENDS, 2013; NFU, 2013). Reforms of this sort also provide an 
opportunity for farmer water abstractor groups to involve themselves more in water resources 
management by acting as market intermediaries in a system of water trading, a function which similar 
groups already perform in other parts of the world (Kloezen, 1998).  
The CAP 
Alongside reforms to water legislation, the CAP has also undergone deep structural changes. Following 
on from Agenda 2000, in June 2003 new reforms were put in place to, a) further decouple subsidies 
from food production, b) make compulsory a system of cross-compliance whereby farm subsidies are 
dependent in part on farmers adhering to a set of Good Agricultural and Environmental Conditions 
(GAECs), including GAECs 18 and 19 which relate to measures for protecting the water environment, 
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and c) to enforce the process of 'modulation' whereby Member States are required to incrementally 
reallocate funds to the pot that finances rural development programmes, such as agri-environment 
schemes (Gay et al., 2005). Since then the CAP has been simplified and streamlined in attempts to 
remove some restrictions on farmers and further align agriculture with price signals on the world 
market. These reforms have been driven in no small part by the international pressure placed on 
European decision makers by the Doha round of WTO negotiations (Nedergaard, 2006; Swinbank and 
Daugberg, 2006). 
The extent to which the various environmental reforms that have been made to the CAP have 
changed farmers’ underlying attitudes, values and beliefs, as opposed to simply influencing their 
behaviour through financial incentives or coercion is something that remains open to much debate. 
Furthermore, despite the range of benefits that acting collectively is known to bring to environmental 
management (Ostrom, 1990; Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000; Lubell et al., 2002; Pretty, 2003), the CAP 
has largely failed to encourage cooperation among farmers for delivering environmental objectives. 
This is brought about at least in part because the areas targeted for cross-compliance measures or agri-
environment schemes in England seek to promote individual farm or field-scale initiatives, as opposed 
to joint action (Franks et al., 2011). 
Yet modest developments are underway to support and encourage greater cooperation among 
farmers in instances where it appears benefit can be derived from doing so. In particular, under two 
options in England’s Environmental Stewardship Scheme (ESS), the largest initiative of the CAP’s Rural 
Development Programme, farmers are provided with an incentive to collaborate under options UX1 (for 
upland farming) and HR8. HR8 is a voluntary option which can be adopted by farmers looking to 
undertake collective measures to achieve environmental benefits that extend beyond the more basic 
entry levels of the ESS (DEFRA, 2012b). Although HR8 was initially intended for situations relating to 
areas of common grazing land, Franks and Emery (2013: 851) have observed that in a handful of 
instances HR8 agreements have been adopted "on non-common lowlands where, in general, they have 
been used with great innovation and inventiveness". However, to date no HR8 agreement has been 
used to support the collective management of water-related issues, despite recognition by the 
government and academic community of the benefits a more joined-up, boundary-spanning approach 
could bring (Lubell et al., 2002; Wallace et al., 2003; Fish et al., 2010).  
DISCUSSION 
Throughout the historical analysis of the previous section we reflected on the evolving interplay of 
three forms of power in different types of spaces at local, national and international levels with respect 
to lowland farming and water governance in England. The intention has been to understand how the 
resulting power structure we identify has come to influence the ability of lowland farmers to participate 
and cooperate in water governance. By drawing on the language of the Power Cube, in this section we 
will highlight the major trends that have been observed, and what they imply for our objective. We 
consider these developments in light of four distinct phases which are encapsulated by Tables 1 
through 4 above, and comprise the periods 1939-1959 (Phase 1), 1960-1983 (Phase 2), 1984-1999 
(Phase 3), and 2000-the present day (Phase 4). The changes are represented in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2. Evolution of the power dynamic governing farming and water management from World War II until the present. 
 
Note: Size of shape indicates relative power of actor. 
Ag: Agriculture (farming and farming lobby); Gov: UK Government; Env: Environmental lobby/groups; Corp: Corporate sector (agribusinesses and food retail); EU: European Union; 
EEC: European Economic Community; UN: United Nations; GATT: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; WTO: World Trade Organisation; RBs: River Boards; RAs: River Authorities; 
EA: Environment Agency; WAG: farmer water abstractor groups. 
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Charting key trends in farming and water governance 
During Phase 1 it is evident that the systems governing farming and water management were most 
distinctly characterised by relationships of power 'over'. This power was held by the government and 
farming lobby at the national level, who together oriented the sector along productivist lines. The 
country also witnessed the emergence of a nascent agri-business industry and supermarket sector, with 
a power 'over' farmers that would continue to grow with time. The visible and hidden forms of power 
exercised by the Government, the farming lobby, agri-business corporations, and other key actors in 
closed spaces resulted in a particular sense of power 'within' farmers that came to shape their thoughts 
and behaviour. This sense of power 'within' is best encapsulated by the concept of 'productivism'. 
Phase 2 witnessed the consolidation of water management responsibilities into fewer, larger 
administrative units as the 32 Rivers Boards were replaced by 29 River Authorities, and then later, in 
Phase 3, by 10 Regional Water Authorities and finally the EA. Phase 2 was also the period when the UK 
joined the European Community (EC). At this point, some of the power 'over' farming and water policy 
that had been held at the national level was subsumed by decision makers operating in closed spaces at 
the European level. One notable feature of the UK’s succession to the EC was the adoption of the CAP, 
which helped incentivise farmers in England to convert to intensive forms of arable production. The 
productivist drive was also strengthened by the growth of the agribusiness industry, and the control 
that a powerful network of government and farming bodies held 'over' land drainage in England, which 
was a key requirement for productive agriculture in many low-lying parts of the country. At the same 
time, the emerging environmental movement, with the power 'to' act in favour of wildlife and 
landscape conservation, claimed spaces at the national, regional, and local levels. The result was a 
series of conflicts, as environmental and commercial farming interests were pitted against each other.  
Throughout Phases 1 and 2 we can see that visible and hidden power exercised by decision makers 
in closed spaces at the national, and increasingly at the European level, tended to dominate the course 
of events in agriculture and water management. However, as Phase 3 progressed a number of these 
closed spaces started to open up under pressure from a range of interests, including the power of 
institutions such as the UN and WTO operating at the international level, and by widespread public 
concern at the national level. In effect, the closed corporatist relationship between the government and 
the farming lobby in England, and the power of farming interests in Brussels, was being undermined on 
a number of fronts. The result tended to be the development of more inclusive decision-making arenas 
that allowed environmental groups to insert 'green ideas' into policy making (Wilson, 2007). The 
influence of the environmental movement at this time is evident by the emergence of farmer water 
abstractor groups at the local level, who were forming in response to new environmental legislation 
that impinged on lowland farmers’ ability to abstract water.  
By the start of Phase 4, the range of actors with the power 'to' influence farming and water 
governance in England was spread across levels spanning the local to the international. As this last 
phase has progressed, one observable characteristic has been the apparent opportunities that the 
farming community now has to participate and cooperate (to develop relationships of power 'with') in 
the governance of their water environment. In large part, these developments have been a result of 
power exercised at the international and European level, in particular through the introduction of the 
WFD which in turn has facilitated the emergence of invited spaces at a more local level with the 
Catchment Based Approach. Another key characteristic of the current system is the power the 
corporate food supply chain exercises 'over' farmers, having continued to expand and embed itself in 
global systems of production (Mazoyer and Roudart, 2006; Weis, 2007).  
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Developing relationships of power 'with'? 
Having outlined the major trends, here we shall consider what they imply for the ability of lowland 
farmers in England to participate and cooperate in water governance; or, to use the language of the 
Power Cube, to develop power 'with' each other and with governmental and non-governmental water 
managers. Despite the structural progression towards more pluralistic forms of water governance, our 
power analysis highlights three distinct barriers that stand in the way of garnering the participation and 
cooperation of farmers.  
The first barrier concerns the power 'within' lowland farmers, which in turn affects their power 'to' 
act. As we have seen, after the war the power 'within' many of these farmers became strongly 
associated with productivism. Although this identity has in turn been challenged by 'post-productivist' 
policies emanating in large part from the EU, other aspects of the system governing farmers have 
continued to nurture and develop it. These include the ongoing support from organisations like the NFU 
for an efficient, expansive, and productive farming sector, the ideological basis of agri-food politics in 
the UK, and the structure of the corporate agri-food chain in which farmers operate. As a result, today 
productivism remains an integral component of farming activity and culture in lowland England (Wilson, 
2001; Walford, 2003; Burton and Wilson, 2006; Marsden and Sonnino, 2008), which has been given 
added impetus since the price rises on fuel and food during 2008 (Marsden, 2010).  
The power 'within' that the productivist identity bestows on many lowland farmers is likely to inhibit 
their power 'to' participate in water governance because of its general failure to account for the 
environment and the often strong ideological strands of individualism and competition that 
accompanies this perspective (Marsden et al., 1993). This would help to explain the general lack of 
involvement of farmers in voluntary initiatives like the Catchment Based Approach. This same power 
dynamic would appear to inhibit the ability of farmers to cooperate with each other in order to 
contribute to water governance objectives as part of a collaboration. The analysis did draw attention to 
the emergence of farmer water abstractor groups, and indicated that despite their focus on lobbying, 
over time they have also benefitted water management. Yet according to our findings, the degree to 
which these groups could 'comanage' (Berkes et al., 1991; Carlsson and Berkes, 2005) water resources 
appears limited at best. Instead, farmer cooperation is most obviously linked to the goal of increasing 
profit by removing obstacles to productive capacity.  
The second barrier concerns the ability of government agencies, and in particular the EA, to move 
from exercising relationships of power 'over' farmers to developing relationships of power 'with' them. 
During the course of the last century, the technically minded administrations in charge of managing 
water in England became increasingly consolidated and centralised. In this light, the organisational and 
cultural challenge posed by more recent developments in water governance that champion 
decentralisation and a partnership approach, is a very real one. It is therefore not clear how easily the 
bureaucracies charged with managing the water environment are willing or able to relinquish power, 
despite adopting a discourse which would suggest otherwise. Perhaps the major difference now is that 
where once government water managers exercised visible power 'over' farmers in order to regulate 
their behaviour, today the same outcome may require the use of hidden power instead. For example, in 
the case of the WFD we saw a tendency for the EA to exercise hidden power so as to maintain control 
of the management process in spite of a more pluralistic and dispersed governance structure. 
Furthermore, developing power-sharing arrangements between the government and farmers is also 
undermined by the distance and mistrust that has come to characterise their relationship (Hall and 
Pretty, 2008). 
The third and final barrier concerns the possibility of farmers developing relationships of power 
'with' non-governmental stakeholders. In particular, this relates to groups such as the rivers trusts, 
wildlife trusts, and RSPB who under the WFD can now position themselves as 'co-deliverers' in the 
management process. Yet the relationship between modern farming and the environmental movement 
Water Alternatives - 2015  Volume 8 | Issue 1 
Whaley and Weatherhead: Power-sharing in the English lowlands Page | 838 
is one founded on conflict and dispute. We have seen that both sides have tended to exercise their 
power 'to' act in ways which are often diametrically opposed. Although the environmental movement 
has achieved a number of gains with respect to agri-environmental practices in lowland England, this 
has tended to be as a result of its ability to curtail (often peripheral) aspects of a production-oriented 
system. Now, with the possible rise of a 'new productivism' (Lobley and Winter, 2009b), the likelihood 
of lowland farmers and environmental groups finding the common ground needed to develop 
relationships of power 'with' seems some way off. 
CONCLUSION 
The introduction to this paper brought attention to the importance of context for understanding both 
the relevance and feasibility of garnering the participation and cooperation of lowland farmers in 
English water governance. We have investigated this issue from a power perspective, by using an 
approach known as the Power Cube. Broadly speaking, this has revealed how since World War II the 
system governing farming and water management has witnessed a dispersal of power across different 
levels of organisation from the local to the international, and in different types of spaces (Figure 2). One 
outcome is the establishment of 'invited spaces' in which non-state actors, including farmers, have an 
opportunity to influence planning and decision making.  
Yet despite this opportunity, the power dynamic revealed by our analysis indicates that three 
distinct barriers stand in the way of involving lowland farmers in English water governance. These are, 
1) the power 'within' these farmers, which continues to be defined in large part by a productivist 
ideology that favours individualism, competition, and profit, often at the expense of the environment, 
2) the ongoing power that government water managers exercise 'over' farmers (and other non-state 
actors) instead of sharing power 'with' them, and 3) the relationship between farming and 
environmental interests, which is characterised by a history of conflict and mistrust. As a caveat, we 
must also point to the broad political economy approach we have adopted. To this extent, despite the 
generality of these claims, the degree to which they apply in reality is of course far more nuanced and 
variable than our conclusions might suggest.  
Nonetheless, the power dynamic highlighted in this paper appears to undermine any expectation 
that lowland farmers in England would willingly participate and cooperate in water governance. This 
realisation provides justification for the use of regulations and financial incentives designed to instigate 
behaviour change. The claim is strengthened by what our analysis has revealed about the evolving 
notion of 'agricultural stewardship', which since World War II has become increasingly tied to an 
expectation of financial compensation. This points to the importance of the current system of agri-
environment and water-related schemes and programmes. Encouraging farmer participation and 
developing a more cooperative approach to water governance will depend on the structure of such 
schemes. To this end, we suggest a greater integration of government programmes and a channelling of 
funding sources. Here CAP payments under ESS options such as HR8 (see above) could combine with 
initiatives like the Catchment Based Approach to provide an impetus for farmers and farmer groups to 
participate in collaborative catchment-wide objectives or joint action at the scale of the local water 
body. 
Yet there is a limit to how far top-down incentives can induce substantive change in the identities 
underlying farmers’ behaviour, at least in the short to medium term (Burton and Wilson, 2006). There 
are enduring discourses, ideologies and power relations born out of the massive upheaval of war which 
remain entrenched in the collective psyche of the farming community, and are associated with notions 
of feeding the nation and what it means to practise 'good farming'. These have been strengthened and 
maintained by the structure and volatility of the global food system, and the economic pressures and 
incentives farmers face (Weis, 2007; Lobley and Winter, 2009b). Although many farmers have adjusted 
to the more recent 'greening' of agricultural policy, time-worn divisions such as the distinction between 
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productive agriculture and a picturesque and wildlife-friendly countryside (Pretty, 2002) will not be 
easily replaced. 
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